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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE ()F UTAH
LEONARD E. HILL,
Plaintiff-Appellant.

Case No.
12136

vs.

ZALE CORPORATION,
Defendant-Respondent.

BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT

NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an action by Plaintiff-Appellant to recover

wages, Yacation pay, moving expenses and a cash award

from Defendant-Respondent.

DISPOSITION IN LO,VER COURT
The Court found that Defendant-Respondent corporation is not subject to service of process within the
1

State of Utah and granted Defendant-Respondent:
-1\'lotion to Dismiss.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL

Plaintiff-Appellant seeks reversal of the tria
court's Order Granting Defendant's }\:lotion to Dismisi.
a determination that the Defendant-Respondent cor·
poration was and is subject to service of process withii,
the State of Utah, and therefore reinstatement of tht
Complaint for further procedings on the merits.
STATE-1\'IEN'l' OF FACTS

Plaintiff-Appellant was employed in various Zal·
stores, including stores in Utah, Idaho and Alaska, fo
a period beginning February 15, 1960 and ending Ju11
30, 1969. Plaintiff-Appellant, at the time a res
dent of Utah, was first employed in a Zale store in Uta
(Answers to Interrogatories #9, R-14).

Zale Corporation is organized under the laws of tl
State of Texas (Affidavit of Zale Corporation by Bt
A. Lipshy, R-11 ) . It is organized into several divisior
including Texoma Wholesale (Answers to lnterrog
tories #Sa, R-13) , Jewelry (Answers to Interrogatori
•
•
#2, R-12), Zale Store (Answers to
R-12) , and Shipping (Answers to Interrogatories I
R-13) divisions, and its general office operation is brl
en down into numerous departments, including const!'I
2

tiull, controller, credit and collections, data processing,
iurestments, legal, personnel, printing and production,
public relations, real estate and security departments
(llequest for Admissions #6, R-8, and Reply to Re(jllCSl for Admissions #6, R-16). Zale Corporation also
owns munerous "wholly-owned subsidiaries" (Affidavit
111' .Zale Corporation by Ben A. Lipshy, R-16) among
which are the Zale stores in Utah and the Zale store in
.\uchorage, Alaska, where Plaintiff-Appellant was last
rn1ployed (Answers to Interrogatories #9, R-14). At
the time Plaintiff-Appellant's employment was termi11ated, arrangements had been made by Zale Corporation
to transfer him to Utah.
The main business enterprise of Zale Corporation
is retailing (\Vritten Interrogatories #4, R-5, and Anto Interrogatories #4, R-13). It maintains warehouses for its retail stores in New York, and in Dallas
am! Arlington, Texas (Answers to Interrogatories # 5,
H-13). The only supplier from which Zale stores obtain
more than ten per cent of the merchandise and inventory
11 hich they retail is the Texoma Wholesale Division of
Zale Corporation. And presumably it is the only supplier
of such merchandise and inventory to the Utah stores
because the Zale stores in Utah pay for the merchandise
and inventory which they retail through charges made
ti1 the store from the Shipping Division. The merchanand inventory is shipped from the above mentioned
warehouses, or occasionaly from factories direct to the
and such shipments are usually made upon the
request of a store manager ('Vritten Interrogatories
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#sa, 8b, and 8c, R-6, and Answers to Interrogatorie,
#sa, 8b, and 8c, R-13, 14).
The "wholly-owned subsidiaries" in Utah do nni
maintain separate and individual checking accounb
they do, however, maintain local depositories, and thei
transfer funds deposited therein to bank accounts
tained by Zale Corporation ( \V ritten lnterrogatorie
#7a and 7b, R-5 and Answers to Interrogatories ;i,
and 7b, R-13).

1

Each of the departments mentioned above ha1r
functions and responsibilities which relate to the opera·
tion, supervision and management of the "wholly-ownec
subsidiaries" (Request for Admissions # 6, R-8, and Re·
ply to Request for Admissions #6, R-16). As an
ample, internal audit functions for the individual Zalt
stores are handled by the Dallas general off ice of Zale
Corporation (Request for Admissions # 5, R-8, arn!
Reply to Request for Admissions # 5, R-16). Ami
the security division, which is responsible for interrie1r·
ing job applicants, conducting polygraph tests on em
ployees and investigating inventory shortages, perform'
its duties in Utah about once a year (Answers to In·
terrogatories #6c and 6d, R-13).
There is an almost complete identity between the
officers and directors of Zale Corporation and the
"wholly-owned subsidiaries" of Zale Corporation
business in Utah. Ben A. Lipshy is President of Zalt
Corporation and President of the Zale stores in Ctal;
Leo Fields, 1\-Iarvin Rubin and John Dickens are Yicr

4

of Zale Corporation and of the Zale stores iu
L' tah; .Esir \Vyll is Secretary of Zale Corporation and
of the Zale stores in Utah; Shearn Rovinsky is Treaslll'er of Zale Corporation and of the Zale stores in Utah.
The Directors of the Zale stores in Utah are Ben A.
Lipshy, Leo Fields and Donald Zale, while Lipshy and
Fields are also Directors of Zale Corporation. All these
live in Dallas, Texas. (Answers to Interrogatories #1 and #2, R-12).
Plaintiff-Appellant, during the approximately ten
years he was employed in various Zale stores, ( includmg those in Utah), never received a paycheck from any
of those individual Zale stores (Request for Admissions
:: l, H-7, and Reply to Request for Admissions #1, Rlli); rather, all checks he received in compensation for
the services he rendered to the individual Zale stores
were mailed from Dallas, Texas, by Zale Corporation.
i Het1uest for Admissions #2, R-7, and Reply to Request for Admissions #2, R-16).
Moreover, the allegations of the complaint indicate
that the Defendant, rather than the individual Zale
stores, retains the authority and/or the prerogative to
11ithhold amounts from wage settlements (Complaint,
Paragraph 4, First Cause of Action, R-1), and that the
Dt>fendant rather than the individual Zale stores retains
and exercises the authority to determine such matters as
)ales promotion and incentive programs for employees
:Complaint, Paragraph 2, Second Cause of Action, R2'. rneation pay (Complaint, Paragraph 2, Third Cause
c,f :\ction, R-2), and payment of moving expenses when
5

employees are transferred (Complaint Paragraph 2
.Fourth Cause of Action, R-3) . \Vhile these matters art
only allegations, it is significant that the Defendant haii
a chance to negate them in the affidavit filed in suppor!
of Defendant's l\>lotion to Dismiss, but failed to do su
(Affidavit of Zale Corporation by Ben A. Lipshy, n.
11).
Service in this action was made on a l\Ir. Richara
Hankin at the Zale store at 129 South l\>lain, Salt Lah
City, Utah (Summons, R-17 and Return, R-17a). Mr
Hankin is an Assistant Vice President and Regional
.:Manager of the Zale Store Division of Zale Corporation
(Answers to Interrogatories #aa, R-12), and his duties.
functions, and responsibilities entail the supervision ot
certain Zale stores in the western United States (Writ·
ten Interrogatories #ab, R-4, and Answers to Interroga·
tories, #ab, R-13). Mr. Hankin does not maintain an
office in Dallas, Texas in connection with the perform
ance of his duties or functions as an Assistant Vice Pres1·
dent and Regional Manager of Zale Store Division, anJ
as a supervisor of Zale stores, (Written
#ac, R-5, and Answers to Interrogatories #ac, R-13
but he does maintain an office in Salt Lake City, Utah
in connection with his performance of said duties anJ
functions ('Vritten Interrogatories #ad, R-5, and An·
swers to Interrogatories #ad, R-la).
1

•

Zale Corporation maintains and publishes a direc·
tory in which the Zale stores in Utah are listed under;.
heading of "Jewelry Store Directory," by store number

6

u\ tl1e name "Zale," by address, by phone number, by
n;anager, and by "general office designation," without
wy indication that the individual stores are separate and
Jistinct corporations (Request for Admissions # 7, R-8,
and Heply to Request for Admissions #7, R-16).

One other factor should be noted. It is obvious that
l'laiutiff contends that a .Mr. Irv Leva was connected
1rith his initial hiring in Utah. ( \V ritten Interrogatories
::10 and #11, R-6). Defendant does admit that Leva
11as an employee of its Zale Store Division, but then
cumeniently states that it does not know what offices
or positions he held when Plaintiff was first hired (Anto Interrogatories #10, R-14), and simply states
that ''the information is not available as to whether Irv
Lem had any connection with the initial hiring of
Leonard Hill" (Answers to Interrogatories #11, R-14).

POINT I.
THE LO\VER COURT ERRED IN
GRANTING DEFENDANT - RESPONDENT
COHPORATION'S MOTION TO DISMISS ON
THE GROUND THAT IT IS NOT SUBJECT
TO SERVICE OF PROCESS WITHIN THE
STATE OF UTAH.
A. A correct construction and application of Rule

l el (4) U.R.C.P., to the facts of this case compels a
rletc:rrnination that service of process upon Richard
Hankin was valid service upon Zale Corporation.
1

7

Rule 4 ( e) ( 4), U.R.C.P., provides for service upon
corporations "not herein otherwise provided for;" anJ
Zale Corporation is certainly not otherwise provided for
inasmuch as it is not a domestic corporation and it is admittedly not a foreign corporation qualified to do business in Utah.
Rule 4 ( e) ( 4) contemplates three different factual
situations and provides for each a different manner ol
service in terms of who may be served. 'l'he first situation is "any corporation, not herein otherwise provideJ
for;" and the service provided is "by delivering a copy
... to an officer, a managing or general agent. ... "The
The second situation is "[i]f no such officer or [manag·
ing or general] agent can be found in the county in
which the action is brought;" and the service provided i)
"then upon any such officer or agent, or any clerk.
cashier, managing agent, chief clerk, or other agent har·
ing the management, direction, or control of any prop·
erty of such corporation ... with the state (emphasi1
added)." Apparently service in the first situation mus!
be made upon the officer or managing agent in the coun·
ty in which the action is brought. But it is also apparenl
that the legislature intended to make service easier in
the situation where the corporation has property within
the state than in the situation where the corporation
maintain only an officer, or managing or general agent
within a particular county.
The third situation is "[i]f no such officer or agen:
can be found in the state, and the defendant .. · doe'
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in this state." In the situation where the defendant corporation is "doing business," which is something more than owning property, the legislature has
made service easiest of all; it may be "then upon the perdoing such business or in charge of ... [the] place
oi business." Because the rule is framed in subordinated
couj1111di,·es, and because the legislature used the phrase
'doing business" only in the last conjunctive, a legislatiYe intent to omit the requirement of a finding that a
eorporation is "doing business" from situations where
the corporation maintains an officer or managing agent
iu the state on a permanent basis, and from situations
where the corporation owns property within the state, is
apparent. That such a construction is sound public policy
is eYidenced by the fact that the more a foreign corporation may be said to be present within the state, "doing
business" being the extreme form of presence, the easier
should service of process made.

In this case, therefore, it is not necessary to reach

the issue of whether Zale Corporation owns property in
this state or is "doing business" here, because the record
clearly establishes that service was made on an officer of
Zale Corporation (Richard Hankin is an Assistant Yice
President of the Zale Store Division of Zale Corporation) or, at the least, on a managing agent (Hankin is
a Regional Manager of said division of Zale Corporation) .
Plaintiff-Appellant does not contend that service
1qion a mere employee of a foreign corporation nor upon
9

an agent who was merely temporarily within the stat
would be appropriate nor sufficient to subject a defend
ant corporation to suit here; rather, a contrary rule ha
been established. W. L. Beard v. White, Green and Ad
dison Assoc. Inc., 8 Utah 2d 424, 336 P.2d 125 (1959J
Western Gas Appliances v. Servel, 123 Utah 229, 2j;
P.2d 950 ( 1953).

It is also established, however, that where the person served in some manner is responsible for or has control over the affairs of the corporation; see discussion u
Beard v. White, Green and Addison Assoc. Inc., supr,_,
at 425; or where the functions performed involve tht
exercise of discretion and the making of business dec1·
sions; see Wills v. National Mineral Co., 176 Okla.193.
55 P.2d 449, at page 453, 454 ( 1936) ; it is appropriatt
to subject the defendant corporation to jurisdiction.

1

The fundamental factor which distinguishes the in·
stant case, however, is that here the defendant corpora·
tion maintains in the county where the action was irn·
tiated an officer and managing agent on a permanen!
and established basis. See discussion at 369 and 3ill.
Prudential Federal Savings
Loan Ass'n. v. Willinm
L. Pereira
Assoc., 16 Utah 2d 365, 401 P.2d
( 1965) . It must be remembered that Mr. Hankin doe'
not maintain offices in Dallas, Texas, where defendant·
home office is located, but does maintain offices in Sal:
Lake City in connection with his duties as Assistant
President and Regional Manager for Zale Corporatim:
And it is not to be thought that these are mere higi

'>r
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titles devoid of any real significance; indeed,
it is established that Hankin' s job entails the supervi:iiou of certain Zale stores in the western part of the
Cnited States, which supervision must certainly necessitate control over corporate affairs, the exercise of discretion, and the making of business decisions. Wills vs.
Xatiunal Mineral Co., supra.
ll. Zale Corporation is "doing business" in Utah for
purposes of submitting itself to jurisdiction within this
state under the provisions of Rule 4 ( e) ( 4), U.R.C.P.
Initially it must be noted that a determination
whether a foreign corporation is "doing business" in a
must be affected by the purpose for which the determination is being made, and that two separate and
distinct questions are involved if the determination relates to the right to subject a foreign corporation to juron the one hand, or to the state's power to impose restrictions or regulations on the other hand. As
stated in 36 Am. J ur. 2d, Foreign Corporations, Sec.
::124 at page 319,
A foreign corporation may be doing business
within the state so as to be subject to the jurisdiction of the local courts and amenable to service of
process therein, and yet not be subject to a statute
regulating foreign corporations or prescribing
conditions of their doing business within the state.
The standards are not the same, and the quality,
character, and quantity of business conducted
within the state may be sufficient for the former
purpose and insufficient for the latter; and decisions holding that the activities of the corpora-

11

tion do not constitute doing business where [
statute] is _the issue are not necessard
ily dec1s1ve or persuasive where the issue is [jur.
isdiction].
Hence, it is clear that Sec. 16-10-102 U.C.A.
( 1953) , which enumerates a list of activities which a
foreign corporation may engage in which "shall
considered to be transacting busines in this state," ha1
no application to the facts of this case. The object of that
section is to prohibit foreign corporations from tram.
acting business in this state until they have procured a
certificate of authority, and the statute itself contailli
the important provisio "for the purposes of this act."
At the hearing of Defendant's Motion to Dismis1
in the lower court, Defendant's counsel appealed to the
court to consider the consequences of a ruling unfaror·
able to Zale Corporation, i.e., that it would be subjed
to the regulatory and taxing statutes of fifty states. See
Sec. 16-10-20 U.C.A. ( 1953), which provides that:
A foreign corporation which transacts businessin
this state without [qualifying] shall be liable . ·
for the years ... during which it transacted bus1·
ness ... in an amount equal to all fees and taxei
which would have been imposed by the laws ol
this state ... had it duly [qualified], plus all pen·
alties imposed by the laws of this state for fa1lurt
to pay such fees and taxes.
Reason compels me to question this well meant ar·
gument advanced by my worthy opponen,t whicn.
amounts nonetheless to a mere parade of
. · dolll''
A determination that a foreign corporat 10n 18

12

uusiuess for purposes of subjecting it to jurisdiction in a
state is simply not the same thing as a determination that
it doing business for purposes of subjecting it to the
regulatory or taxing power of the state.
the fact that none of several acts or
transactions considered separately constitute doing business is uot conclusive. 36 Am. Jr. 2d, Foreign Corporations, Sec. 319, page 316. \Vhat must be considered is
the total combination of the facts of each individual case.
Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437,
S. Ct. 413 (1952); International Shoe Co. v. State of
Washinyton, 326 U.S. 310, 66 S. Ct. 154 ( 1945).
\ Vhile the facts that the individual Zale stores in
Ctah have been set up as separate corporations and that
they are "wholly owned subsidaries," taken alone, are
certainly not an indication that Zale Corporation is prestnt or doing business in Utah, there are numerous facts
in the record more than sufficient to establish the presence of Zale Corporation in Utah and the fact that it is
doing business here.
In the first place, service was made on an Assistant
Yice President and Regional Manager of a division of
Zale Corporation, Richard Hankin; Zale Corporation
maintains him in Salt Lake on a permanent and established basis inasmuch as he does not maintain an off ice
in Texas, but does maintain one in Salt Lake City, Utah,
in connection with his performance of his duties and
functions as an employee of Zale Corporation. See Belk
'· Bcll/s Department Store, 250 N. C. 99, 108 S.E. 2d

13

131 ( 1959), where the Court thought to be substant'la.

contact with the state of the forum, among other factor)
the maintainence of executives' offices. And see gener.
ally 36 Am. J ur. 2d, Foreign Corporatiom, Sec. 35!.
page 368, citing Washington-Virginia Rail Co. v. Rea! 1
Estate 1'rust Co., 238 U.S. 185, 35 S. Ct. 818, 59 L.Ed ,
1262 ( 1915), for the proposition that
the maintainence of an office in the state for tht
performance by the general officers of theu 1
duties of management and supervision of thf
affairs of the corporation amounts to doing bus1. •
ness therein.
Because the main business enterprise of Zale CorporatiOL
is retailing, and because Hankin is employed by Zalt ·
Corporation to supervise Zale stores, it is obvious that •
he is furthering the main business enterprise of Zale Cor·
poration in Utah, and that he, and Zale Corporation, art
placed squarely within the doctrine of the foregoing
authorities. The conclusion is therefore inescapable that
Zale Corporation is "doing business" in Utah.
Furthermore, to accomplish its main business enter·
prise of retailing, at least as far as the Zale stores m
Utah are concerned, Zale Corporation's Texoma Whole·
sale Division ships to the retail stores the merchandist
and inventory which the stores retail; for the most part
such shipments originate from warehouses maintainf'J
by Zale Corporation for its retail stores, and the ship·
ments are "usually made upon the request of a storr
manager." The answer to Interrogatory #Sc, (R·J:J.
14), has been quoted to show clearly that there at lea).

14

are some instances where shipments of merchandise are
made to Zale stores without the store manager having
requested them. In other words, the power and prerogative is retained somewhere within the maze of Zale' s
corporate structure, in order to accomplish its main business enterprise, to determine what merchandise the indiridual Zale stores will retail and to ship said merchandise to the stores. The fact that a store manager may not
desire a particular shipment of merchandise because it
consists of a slow moving item is of no real importance to
the individual store, because that store will not have to
lay out hard cash for the shipment anyway. The indiridual Zale stores in Utah pay for merchandise and inrentory which they retail through charges made to that
store from the shipping division of Zale Corporation.
the individual Zale stores in Utah do not
maintain separate and individual checking accounts, but
they do maintain local depositaries and they transfer
funds from such depositaries to accounts maintained by
Zale Corporation; presumably it is in this manner that
the individual Zale stores in Utah receive credit for the
charges which they have incurred for merchandise and
inventory. It is obvious from the foregoing arrangement
that the "wholly-owned subsidiaries" are merely parts
of an integrated national marketing operation; see
Szantay vs. Beech Aircraft Corp., 237 F. Supp. 393
iE.D.S.C. 1965); and that to effectuate its national
1narketing operation, control by Zale Corporation and
the result of its business decisions actually extend into
l'tah.
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There are other facts ample to establish that za,
Corporation is doing business in Utah. As has bet
stated, Zale Corporation is organized into numerous dt
partments, including construction, controller, credit ari.
collections, data processing, investments, legal, persori·
nel, printing and production, public relations, rea
estate, and security departments. Each of these depar
ments has functions and responsibilities which relate :
the operation, supervision and management of the ind
vidual Zale stores. How can it be denied that Zale C111
poration is doing business in Utah when each of tn.
eleven departments of Zale Corporation has function·
and responsibilities which relate to the operation, super
vision and management of one or more of the individu,
Zale stores in Utah. Perhaps Plaintiff's counsel missed;
good bet when he failed to elicit more information abou
the exact nature of the functions and responsibilitiesl'
the departments in relation to the stores; but it has bee
established that internal audit functions for the indi\'lli
ual Zale stores are handled by the Dallas general offo
of Zale Corporation; see Belk v. Belks Departm1
Store; supra, and that the security division performs tn·
functions of interviewing job applicants,
polygraph tests on employees and investigating inreri
tory stortages in Utah about once a year.
1

1

Perhaps the most damaging fact of all is that du:
ing the ten years Appellant worked in various za:
stores, including stores in Utah, he never received a pa:
check from any of those individual Zale stores; all chrc•
he received as an employee were f rom Z al e Corporatw
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.1.nd when Plaintiff was initially hired to work in a .Zale
in Utah, Zale Corporation, rather than the individual store in which Plaintiff was employed, determined,
as it does now, such matters as wage settlements, sales
promotion and incentive programs, vacation pay, and
payment of moving expenses.

C. However, even if the view that the Respondent
is "doing business" in Utah should not prevail, this
Court is not required to reject jurisdiction over Zale
Corporation, because the test of what constitutes "doing
business," which, as was stated in McGriff v. Charles
Antell Int·., 123 Utah 166, page 170, 256 P.2d 703
(1953), "in an ever changing world is ever changing,"'
has indeed undergone much change toward liberalization
in the recent past. See generally Perkins v. Benguet
Cunsolidated Mining Co., International Shoe Co. v.
State of 1¥ashington, both supra, and 73 Harvard L.
H.er. 909, 919 ( 1960). The degree of change has been
such that the editor of one authoritative text has stated
that the United States Supreme Court "has discarded
the 'doing business,' 'presence,' or 'consent' theories as
the standard for measuring the extent of a state's judicial power over foreign corporation.... " 36 Am. J ur.
Zd, Foreign Corporations, Sec. 325, page 320, citing the
International Shoe case. And while a "solicitation plus"
rule has still been applied in some states subsequent to
the landmark International Shoe decision, M cGriff v.
Charles Antell, Inc., supra, and other cases cited at n. 8,
:JI) Am. J ur. 2d, Foreign Corporations, Sec. 356, page
·315.i, it is clear that the United States Supreme Court has
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rejected at least the "mere solicitation rule." See cait
cited n.n. 4 and 5, 36 Am. Jur. 2d, Id.
There can be little doubt that the modern test l
what activities or connections of a foreign corporationc
or with the state of the forum will be sufficient to war
rant subjecting the corporation to jurisdiction, and tl1:
trend followed by most of the states, stems from Info
national Shoe. And while it is true that the Due Proce"
Clause of the Federal Constitution does not require tt,
states to accept the "minimum contacts" doctrine them
enunciated, it is also established that the Due Prom·
Clause does not prevent the states from applying ili·
minimum contacts doctrine to its fullest extent, the issllr
on a constitutional level being one of general fairness t,
the corporation. Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Cu.
International Shoe Co. v. State of Washington, and i.,
Harvard L. Rev. 909, 919, all supra.

International Shoe Co. vs. State of Washingtu1!.
326 U.S. 310, 66 S. Ct. 154 ( 1945), was the culminati\)
of a proceeding brought in the courts of Washington Ii!
that state to recover unpaid contributions to the state ut
employment compensation fund. International Shoe C
had defended on the grounds that ( 1) service which wi·
had on its salesman was not proper service on it; (2) thi
it was not a corporation of that state and was not doin.
business there; and ( 3) that it had no agent within tlir
state upon whom service could be made. The issue tht.·
squarely presente d was wh eth er t h e court s of W·ishiM
" ..
ton had the power to subject the defendant rorporatll'
to their jurisdiction.
1

1
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The facts, as stated by the Court at page 313, 314
are as follows:
[International Shoe Co.] is a Delaware corporation, having its principal place of business in St.
Louis, Missouri, and is engaged in the manufacture and sale of . . . footwear. It maintains places of business in several states,
other than Washington, at which its manufacturing is carried on and from which its merchandise
is distributed interstate through several sales units
or branches located outside the State of 'Vashington.
Appellant has no office in \Vashington and
makes no contracts either for sale or purchase of
merchandise there. It maintains no stock of merchandise in that state and makes there no deliveries of goods in interstate commerce. During the
years from 1937 to 1940, now in question, appellant employed eleven to thirteen salesmen under
direct supervision and control of sales managers
located in St. Louis. These salesmen resided in
\Vashington; their principal activities were confined to that state; and they were compensated by
commissions based upon the amount of their sales.
. . . On occasion they rent permanent sample
rooms, for exhibiting samples, in business buildings, or rent rooms in hotels or business buildings
temporarily for that purpose. The cost of such
rentals is reimbursed by appellant.
The authority of the salesmen is limited to exhibiting their samples and soliciting orders from
prospective buyers, at prices and on terms fixed
by appellant. The salesmen transmit the orders
to appellant's office in St. Louis for
or rejection, and when accepted the merchandise
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for filling the orders is shipped f.o.b. from poinL
outside \'V ashington to the purchasers within ti,
state_. A_ll
merchandise shipped into \Vashiiig
ton is mvo1ced at the place of shipment iroit
which collections are made. No salesman ha'
authority to enter into contracts or to make crJJ·
lections.

1

The Court, after noting that the historical basis,
jurisdiction is presence within the territorial limits of ti11
jurisdiction, went on, at page 316, to state the fuud:i·
mental proposition of the entire opinion:

Due process requires only that in order to subjec:
a defendant to a judgment in personum, if he be
not present within the territory of the forum, lw
have ce1tain minimum contacts with it such tha;
the maintainence of the suit does Mt off end fn,.
ditional notions of fair play and substantial ,ju)·
tice.
The Court continued:
Since the corporate personality is a fiction ... ::
is clear that unlike an individual its 'presenct
without, as well as within, the state of its orig11,
can be manifested only by activities carried 01
in its behalf by those who are authorized to art
for it. ... [TJhe terms 'present' or 'presence' arr
used merely to symbolize those activities of thr
corporation's agent within the state which court·
will deem to be sufficient to satisfy the
of due process .... (Citations omitted, emphasi·
added.)
The Court then reduced its formula of "actiritit,
of the corporation's agent within the state which
will deem to be sufficient to satisfy the demands of dur
process" to
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such contracts of the corporation with the state
of the forum as make it reasonable, in the context of our federal system ... to require the corporation to defend the particular suit which is
brought there. An 'estimate of the inconveniences' which would result to the corporation from
a trial away from its 'home' or principal place of
business is relevant in this connection [citing

Hutchinson v. Chase and Gilbert, 45 F. 2d 139,
141 (2nd Cir. 1930)).

The Court concluded that International Shoe Co.
subject to the 'Vashington Court's jurisdiction with
the following language at page 317:
Presence in the state in this sense, has never been
doubted when the activities of the corporation
there have not only been continuous and systematic, but also give rise to the liabilities sued on, even
though no consent to be sued or authorization to
an agent to accept service of process has been
given ....
Applying these standards, the activities carried
on in behalf of [International Shoe Co.] were
neither irregular nor casual. They were systematic and continuous through the years in question .
. . . The obligation which is here sued upon arose
out of those very activities. It is evident that these
operations establish sufficient contacts or ties
with state of the forum to make it reasonable and
just according to our traditional conception of
fair play and substantial justice to permit the
state to enforce the obligations which appellant
has incurred there. Hence we cannot say that the
maintainence of the present suit in the State of'
'Vashington involves an unreasonable or undue
procedure.
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Does Zale Corporation have such mmnnum cv
tacts with L"tah as make it reasonable to require it 0,
fend Appellant's action here 1 How much of a burdt
will be placed on Zale Corporation if it be required:
defend here, in relation to the burden placed on Appe
lant by requiring him to bring suit in Anchorage, Ala.
ka, his place of last employment in a Zale store, or.
Dallas, Texas, Zale Corporation's state of incorporatir
and presumably its principal place of business? A con.
parison of the facts of the case at bar to those of the J,
ternationalShoecase clearly shows that Zale Corporatio
has sufficient contacts or ties with the State of
and the relative inconveniences to the parties are suer
that it is "reasonable and just according to tra<litionc
concepts of fair play and substantial justice" to sustar
jurisdiction in this case.
In the first place, an executive officer of Za,
Corporation maintains an office in Salt Lake Counr.
unlike International Shoe Co. which maintained no o:
fices in 'Vashington. Secondly, Zale Corporation's Te
oma 'Vholesale Division regularly ships merchandise:
the Zale stores in Utah usually at the request of the stor·
manager, unlike International Shoe Co. which
made contracts for the sale or purchase of merchandilt
maintained a stock of merchandise, nor made delirerir
in 'V ashington. These factors make the case for sustarr
ing jurisdiction even stronger than existed in I ntenitional Shoe. But moreover, like International Shoe Cr
employees of the Zale stores are under direct supe:
vision, in this case that of an executive officer of Z:i
Corporation.
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Appellant contends that even if the factors discussed
above as establishing that Zale Corporation is "doing
business" in Utah (i.e., Zale Corporation retains authority to ship merchandise and inventory into Utah to the
indiYi<lual Zale stores even if the store manager has not
requested the shipment; the shipments are paid for by
"charges" to the stores which are balanced out by credits
recei,·e<l for transfers of funds from local depositaries
maintained by the individual stores to Zale Corporation
accounts; each of the departments into which Zale Corporation is organized has functions and responsibilities
which relate to the operation, supervision and management of the individual Zale stores in Utah, including
specifically internal audit and security functions; and
the fact that employees of the individual Zale stores receiYe their compensation not from the stores but from
Zale Corporation) be viewed as not constituting "doing
business," then at the very least these factors constitute
the minimum contacts or ties with the State of Utah required by the International Shoe decision.

There is an additional reason for so holding. \Vhat
the court in the International Shoe case really did was
eonstruct a continuum of corporate activity with a high
degree of contacts or ties on one end and a negligible degree, or single or isolated acts, on the other end. Corporate activities on the high end of the scale, will easily
sustain jurisdiction. But even activities on the negligible
end of the scale, i.e., a single act or transaction, have
' been held to be sufficient activity within the state to
'uhject a foreign corporation to local jurisdiction and
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process where the cause of action arises from that It
activity. See ilfcGee v. lnternatiolUd Life lmura1
Co., 355 U ..S. 2:W, 78 S. Ct. 199 ( 1957), and otherta!
cited at 36 Am. J ur. 2d, Poreiyn Corporations, Sec. :r
n. 5, page 334.
In this case not only do the facts establish a Ji..
degree of activity in Utah by Zale Corporation 11
alone the contention that the activity constitutes "dou.
business") , but plaintiff's cause of action may be saiJ
have arisen from said activities. Thus, the security <ln
sion of Zale Corporation is responsible for interrie11u.
job applicants, and the record indicates (Answer to I
terrogatory #9, R-14) that appellant was first employt
at a Zale store in Utah. Since appellant seeks recorn
for wages and other items wrongfully withheld it is 11
vious that the cause of action arises directly from f1
employment in Zale stores which may be traced back·
his initial hiring in Utah.
One court has apparently been willing to aband
even the requirement of a minimum contact. In Jf'a."
ington vs. Hospital Service Plan of New Jersey, 31
F.2d 105 (D.C. Cir. 1965), a New Jersey insurer11•
qualified to do business in the District of Columbia, an
maintaining no office there, but administering its lw!
pitalization plan through another insurance carrier 115 ·
held amenable to local process in an administrator
damage suit for insurer's mistaken disclaimer of corf'
age.
1
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The court, at page 108, said:
The concept of doing business . . . has enough
vitality to encompass newer ways of making a cor·
porate presence felt in a particular place for the
advancement of the corporation's essential business purposes.
The court stated that the defendant:
concededly has none of the familiar indicia of
office space, personnel, bank accounts, telephone
listings, and so on which have immemorially been
the counters in the jurisdictional game. These
presumably might have existed if the insurer had
acted itself to administer the performance in the
district of its contracts with district or residence.
It appears, however, to have effected that admini::itration in another way, that is, through the off ices, personnel, and facilities of a sister insurer
... for whom it provides similar expert service in
New Jersey. Through this convenient arrangement effectuated under the brooding omnipresence of the Blue Cross Association a New Jersey
corporation can carry on a business relationship
with a District of Columbia resident involving
performance of the contract in the district without ever appearing to have extended its physical
embodiment beyond New Jersey's powers. . ..
['V]e think that insurer's corporate presence was
sufficiently tangible to require the insurer properly summoned to answer a district resident in a
district court for an alleged dereliction having
its immediate impact in the district. The concept
of doing business, although heavily laden with the
traditional paraphernalia of bank accounts and
telephone listings in our view still has enough
t'ifalif;IJ to encompass newer ways of making a
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corporate presence felt in a particular space,
the advancement of the corporation's es8en1,
husincss process (emphasis added).

D. There is an additional substantial reason l
this court to hold that Zale Corpora ti on not only has SL
ficient minimum contacts with this state to sustain jur
diction, but that Zale Corporation is actually doing bu,
ness in Utah.
Although ordinarily a foreign corporation is n,
doing business in the state merely because it
inates or controls a subsidiary or affiliated
ration doing business there, a contrar.lJ viei.':
taken where nu corporate separation is in fil
maintained and it appears that the employmei
of the subsidiary or affiliate is a mere device:
cover actual activities of the foreign corporafa·
so that the latter may properly be said to be Cfli
ducting its own business in the state, though, ur
der another name. In such a case, it is sl!.id, tf,
courts will look through form to substance, au.
where the power of stock ownership or otht
means of control is so exercised as to commingi:
the affairs of the corporations and make tht[
practically one, will not permit themselves to l·
blinded or defeated by mere forms of law, but rt
gardless of fiction, will deal with the substant
of the transaction involved as if the corpora:
agency did not exist. If the corporate business'
a subsidiary and that of the parent company ar
so hazily confused that the officials
do not know which is which, the legal fict10n'
separate corporate entities evaporates, and .tf.
courts will deal with the realities of the sit11allr1
Of course, where the for cir; n corporation is if.ii
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µresent in the state and acting on its own account
through its officers and agents, as well as throur;h
its domination of the local subsidiary or affiliate,
it ma.IJ be held to be doing business in the state.
(Citations and notes omitted, emphasis added.)
i36 Am. J ur.
Foreign Corporations, Sec. 347.

This rationale was followed in the case of Szantay
rs. Beech Aircraft Corp., supra, where the Federal
L'ourt in South Carolina held that a foreign corporation
1rns su/Jstantially involved with a local distributor as to
rnnstitute doing business through such distributor. The
court looked to the substance of the relationship rather
than to mere verbalism or the technical legal absence of
traditional agency relationships, and found the distributor an agent for the purpose of receiving service of process. The court relied on its finding that the distributor
was subject to pervasive and extensive control by the
defendant foreign corporation, and was merely one part
1f an integrated national marketing operation; the defendant asserted control over the local distributor in relation to quota, advertising, accounting, prices, and other
arrangements; and in light of this closely integrated relationship found the defendant corporation was
really doing business in a form more than sufficient to
'atisfy the minimum contact requirement.
1

A similar decision was reached in Dell Ray Beach
.lriation Corporation vs. Mooney, 332 F.2d 135 (Fifth
Cir. HHl4). See also Taca International vs. Rolls Royce
11! E11yland, 15 NY.2d 97, 256 N.Y.S.2d 129 (Court of
.\ ppeals of New York 1965), where the court comment-
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ed that in personum jurisdiction cannot be avoided I
separate incorporation of a mere department.

In Kane vs. U.S.S.R., 267 F. Supp. 109 (E.I
Pa. 1967), service was made on a local wholly owut
subsidiary of a foreign corporation and in upholding
personum jurisdiction the court placed great empha)
on the management contract between the foreign 1u
the domestic corporation. In the case at bar it has n
been established that a management contract exists, bi
at least we know that the Zale stores do in fact subu
to supervision.

The fact is that while Zale Corporation is structur1
into "wholly-owned subsidiaries," the separation is mo
illusive than real. In the first place, there is an almc
complete identity between the officers and directors
Zale Corporation and the Zale stores in Utah. And,
has already been noted several times, each of the eler
departments of Zale Corporation has functions and 1
sponsibilities which relate to the operation, superrisi(
and management of the Zale stores in Utah. 'Ve kni
that internal audit, security, interviewing job applican
conducting polygraph tests on employees, investigati
inventory shortages, at least some payroll, wage sett
ment and sales promotion or employee incentive P
grams, and merchandising functions or decisions are
retained by Zale Corporation; and the names of theotl
departments indicate the functions which they perfo
for the Zale stores in Utah-credit and collections, d:
processmg, printing and production, and public re
tions.
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ln fact, Zale Corporation itself does not really regard the "wholly-owned subsidiaries" as separate and
distinct entities. Zale Corporation maintains and publishes a directory in which the Zale stores are listed under
a heading of "Jewelry Store Directory," which would
indicate to the average citizen of Utah that Zale Corporation itself regards the Zale stores in Utah as its
, "jewelry stores," rather than alerting him to the fact
that Zale Corporation may later try to escape jurisdiction in Utah by claiming that "the Zale stores in Utah
are corporations organized under the laws of Utah, are
"wholly-owned subsidiaries," and that Zale Corporatiou
' ill a foreign corporation, is not qualified to do business in
r tah and/ or does not do business in u tah.
The almost complete and autonomous control over
tbe affairs of its subsidiaries retained and exerted by
Zale Corporation in effect makes the subsidiaries merely
' the alter ego of Zale Corporation. Hence, this Court
would and should be justified in looking to the substance
of the relationship, holding that the Zale stores in Utah
are merely parts of an integrated national marketing
operation, and that therefore Zale Corporation itself is
really doing business in Utah in a form more than sufficient to satisfy the minimum contact requirement. See
Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul R.R. Co. v. Minne11µ0/is Civic & Commerce Ass'n, 247 U.S. 490, 62 L.Ed.
mg (1918) ; Pergament v. Frazier, 93 F. Supp. 9
E.D. Mich. 1949).
1

The instructive discussion of this subject in 73 Har-
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vard L. Rev. 909, at page 932-33, suggests that eour
have employed the following theories, all of which a:
applicable to the case at bar, in "piercing the corporr
veil" and holding foreign corporations subject to jun
diction:
1. Defendant foreign corporation is holding a lot.

concern out as its agent, citing Bator v. Boosey.
Hawkes, Ltd., 80 F. Supp. 294 (S.D.N.Y. 1948) ,,.·
ternative holding) ; Duraladd Prods. Corp. v. Supm
Court, 134 Cal.App.2d 226, 285 P.2d 699 (Dist. l
App. 1955) ; and H. F. Campbell Const. Co. v. Pa/or
bit, 347 :Mich. 340, 79 N.W.2d 915 ( 1956).
2. Separation of defendant foreign corporation au
local subsidiary is fictitious, citing U.S. v. Buffa!
Belting Co., 155 F. Supp. 454 (S.D.X.Y
1956) ; Skupski v. Western N av. Corp., 123 F. Supr
309 (S.D.N.Y. 1954); State ex rel. Grinnell Co.:
MacPherson, 62 N.M. 308, 309 P.2d 981, cert. denie,
355 U.S. 825 ( 1957); and 104 U. Pa. L. Rev. 381,
3. Extent of control, citing Bach v. Friden Cafr,
lating Machine Co., 167 F.2d 679 (6th Cir .1948

Springs Cotton Mills, Inc. v. Machinecraft, Inc., Jjr
F. Supp. 372 ('V.D.S.C. 1957); and Bargesser v. Coli
man Co., 230 S.C. 562, 96 S.E.2d 825 ( 1957).

The writer of the Harvard Law Review article
gests the corporate veil was pierced in the above ca·c
for what boils down to two reasons: first, the defendan·
foreign corporation was deriving economic gain frtll.
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the
of the forum, so that it was reasonable and fair
to require it to allocate a portion of that economic gain
to the cost of defending the suit in the state where the
was realized; and, secondly, because the foreign
Lorporation actually has representation in the state, it
not unfair to require them to defend there. Appellant
)uggests and contends that both of these reasons are well
founded in sound public policy, and that they are both
applicable to the case at bar. See Orange-Crush Grapico
Bottling Co. v. Seven-Up Co., 128 F. Supp. 174 (N.D .
.Ua. 1955), where the defendant foreign corporation
had issued franchises to local independently owned conbut engaged in extensive efforts to promote sales
by the local concerns; the court indicated that by boosting sales of the independent bottling companies, and
thereby increasing its own revenues and deriving a profit
from the state, the defendant was transacting business
11ithin the meaning of the Alabama statute.

CONCLUSION
This Court should hold that Zale Corporation is
'uhject to service of process within the State of Utah, at
least insofar as this case is concerned, for the following
reasons:

A. Rule 4(e) (4) U.R.C.P., correctly construed
requires only that a foreign corporation maintain an
agent on a permanent and established basis within the
l'ltmty within which the action is brought (as Zale Cor31

poratiou docs in his case), apart from any
whether the corporation is "doing business" in Ill
state,in order to acquire jurisdiction over the corp,
ration when service is had on that agent.
H. In any event, Zale Corporation is "<loi11g bu,
ness" in the State of Utah within the meaning of Hu
4 (e) ( 4), U.R.C.P.

C. l\loreover, the appropriate test for this Court
apply is no longer a "doing business," test based .
theories of "presence" or "consent" or the "solicitat11'
plus" rule; the appropriate test, as set forth by the J,.
ternational Shoe case, requires only "minimum contar:
such that maintainence of the suit does not offend trad1
tional notions of fair play and substantial justice." Sud
minimum contacts have clearly been established in th1·
case.

D. And finally, Zale Corporation should be held t
be doing business in Utah, at least in a form sufficient t
satisfy the minimum contact doctrine, because its e111
ployment of "wholly-owned subsidiaries" to operate i:retail outlets in Utah amounts to nothing more than .
device to cover its own activities in the state in furthu
ance of its main business enterprise.
Respectfully submitted,
Richard M. Day
Attorney for Appellant
Continental Bank
Salt Lake City Utah 841 11 '
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